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GLD-143        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1079 
___________ 
 
RICHARD Y. THOMPSON a/k/a MALACHI SHARIF SHABAZZ-EL a/k/a MALACHI 
SHARIF OPADAYEEN SHABAZZ-EL 
 
RICHARD Y. THOMPSON, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRANDYWINE SCHOOL DISTRICT; BARBARA MERIDITH; TODD CONN; 
DEBRA BULLOCK; KIMBERLY DOHERTY; GLENN COSTILL;  
BRUCE JOHANNSMIER; JOHN READ 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-07-cv-00596) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.5 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 22, 2012 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 18, 2012) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Richard Thompson1
I. 
 appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware’s order granting defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment and denying his motion for summary judgment.  Because this appeal 
does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
order.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In May 2006, Thompson filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming that his former employer, 
Brandywine School District, and several employees thereof violated Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) by discriminating and retaliating against him based on 
his race.  The alleged discriminatory acts took place on March 3, 2006.  On August 13, 
2007, the EEOC provided Thompson with a right-to-sue letter, and in September 2007, 
Thompson filed a private action in the District Court, claiming that the defendants 
discriminated against him based on his religion and national origin rather than due to his 
race. 
 The District Court dismissed Thompson’s case in February 2008 for failure to 
comply with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as he did not serve the 
complaint on the defendants.  Soon thereafter, the District Court granted Thompson’s 
motion to reopen the case.  In September 2009, Thompson filed a motion to amend his 
                                              
1 It appears that Thompson now refers to himself by the name “Malachi Shabazz-El.”  
However, because he filed the case under the name “Richard Thompson,” we will refer to 
him as such.  
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complaint and for the first time claimed that he had been discriminated against based on 
his race.  
 The parties thereafter engaged in discovery and motion practice, and on September 
30, 2010, the District Court granted Thompson’s 2009 motion to amend the complaint.  
Discovery continued until early 2011, when Thompson and the defendants filed motions 
for summary judgment.  The defendants asserted that Thompson’s complaint should be 
dismissed because his nationality- and religion-based discrimination claims were 
unexhausted and his race-based claims were time-barred.2
 Thompson now appeals. 
  The District Court agreed, and 
granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion in an order entered on December 15, 
2011.  The District Court denied Thompson’s summary judgment motion as moot.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard as does 
the district court.  McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary 
judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Haybarger v. Lawrence 
County Adult Probation & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2012).  
                                              
2 The defendants also argued that Thompson could not set forth a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  
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 Upon review of the record, we conclude that the District Court correctly granted 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  A plaintiff bringing an employment 
discrimination claim under Title VII must exhaust his or her remedies by complying with 
the procedural requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.  Those requirements 
include filing a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful 
employment practice.  See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(e)(1); Burgh v. Borough Council of 
Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, Thompson failed to 
comply with this requirement to the extent that his District Court complaint raised claims 
of discrimination based on his national origin and religion.  These claims were not 
brought to the attention of the EEOC and accordingly did not fall within the scope of its 
investigation.  The District Court thus properly dismissed these claims as unexhausted.  
See, e.g., Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295-96 (3d Cir. 1996); Webb v. City of 
Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Additionally, although Thompson did exhaust his claims for racial discrimination 
and retaliation, he was required to bring a private action based on those charges within 90 
days after receiving the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter, which was issued in August 2007.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Burgh, 251 F.3d at 472.  He did not, however, raise such 
claims until he filed his amended complaint, which occurred more than two years after 
receiving the EEOC’s letter.  “We have strictly construed the 90-day period and held that, 
in the absence of some equitable basis for tolling, a civil suit filed even one day late is 
time-barred and may be dismissed.”  Burgh, 251 F.3d at 470.  Here, there is no indication 
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that any basis exists for tolling the limitation period for filing the claim based on race 
discrimination.  Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed the claim as time-
barred.  
  We have reviewed Thompson’s submissions in support of his appeal and 
conclude that his arguments are meritless.  For the foregoing reasons, this appeal presents 
“no substantial question” and we will therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We deny Appellees’ motion for 
summary action as moot.  
